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THE DOMESTICATED LIBERTY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
Katherine M. Franke∗ 
 
In this Commentary, Professor Franke offers an account of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.  She concludes that 
in overruling the earlier Bowers v. Hardwick decision, Justice 
Kennedy does not rely upon a robust form of freedom made available 
by the Court's earlier reproductive rights cases, but instead 
announces a kind of privatized liberty right that allows gay and 
lesbian couples the right to intimacy in the bedroom.  In this sense, 
the rights-holders in Lawrence are people in relationships and the 
liberty right those couples enjoy does not extend beyond the domain 
of the private.  Franke expresses concern that Lawrence risks 
domesticating the gay and lesbian civil rights movement.  She argues 
that the limited scope of the Lawrence opinion, as well as the gay 
community's reaction to it, can be traced, in large part, to the 
palimpsestic presence of Bowers in the opinion and in the political 
organizing that has followed it. 
INTRODUCTION 
In significant ways, this has been a breakthrough year for the gay and 
lesbian rights movement.  Canada and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
have legalized same-sex marriage, while thousands of gay and lesbian couples 
have been issued marriage licenses in San Francisco.  The Episcopal Church 
anointed its first openly gay bishop, and the U.S. Supreme Court found 
sodomy laws unconstitutional.1  Then of course there’s Queer Eye for the 
Straight Guy and The L Word. 
Gay rights activists and scholars have rejoiced at these victories.  Indeed, 
some have gone so far as to label the decision in Lawrence v. Texas “our 
Brown.”2  Immediately after the decision was announced, Lambda Legal’s 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.  For helpful comments, questions, 
discussions, and suggestions, I am grateful to Ariela Dubler, Renée Römkens, Teemu Ruskola, 
Arun Subramanian, and Jeremy Waldron.  Patricia Wencelblatt provided invaluable research 
assistance.  An earlier version of this Commentary was delivered in the fall of 2003 at the Sexual 
Worlds, Political Cultures conference in Washington D.C. celebrating the 20th anniversary of the 
publication of historian John D'Emilio's Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities.  The radical sexual 
rights agenda of the early homophile movement that D'Emilio described in this book continues to 
influence my thinking about the nature of gay rights organizing today. 
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
2. For comparisons between Lawrence and Brown, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Yale Law 
School and the Overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick, 51 Yale L. Rep. 36, 36 (2004); Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 
101 
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legal director delighted in a press release:  “[This] landmark victory . . . 
recognizes that love, sexuality and family play the same role in gay people’s 
lives as they do for everyone else.”3  The ACLU proclaimed:  “It gave us the 
constitutional right to form intimate relationships and to sexual expression.  
For that, Lawrence changes everything.”4  Everything?  That may overstate the 
significance of the case somewhat.  But what did Lawrence do—as a matter of 
freedom, as a matter of rights, as a matter of sexual politics?  What kind of 
emancipatory horizon was opened up by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence? 
In this commentary I provide a critical reading of both the Lawrence 
opinion and the gay community’s response to it.  I argue that in Lawrence the 
Court relies on a narrow version of liberty that is both geographized and 
domesticated—not a robust conception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is 
commonly assumed.  In this way, Lawrence both echoes and reinforces a pull 
toward domesticity in current gay and lesbian organizing.  This gravitational 
pull, in important respects, can be understood as the residue of Bowers v. 
Hardwick.  Teemu Ruskola points out that “insofar as the Hardwick Justices 
asserted patently counterfactually that there is ‘[n]o connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on 
the other,’ it was important to remind the world that gay people, too, have 
families.”5  Thus, although Lawrence unambiguously reversed Bowers in a 
formal legal sense, it did not, and of course, could not, erase it from our 
cultural and political landscape.6  Yet the gay community finds itself invested 
 
Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 61–66, on file with the Columbia Law Review); 
E.J. Graff, The High Court Finally Gets It Right, Boston Globe, June 29, 2003, at D11; High 
Court Busy As Term Ends, CBS News, May 30, 2003, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/30/supremecourt/main556319.shtml (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“For the gay community, Lawrence is their Brown v. Board of 
Education, their major civil rights case.” (quoting Georgetown University Law Center Professor 
Richard Lazarus)); Adam DeBaugh, The LGBT “Threat” to Straight Marriage, at 
http://www.whosoever.org/v8i2/marriage.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“This has already been called our Brown . . . .”).  Nan Hunter provides a 
thoughtful reading of the parallels between Lawrence and Brown in Living with Lawrence, 88 
Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1124–25, on file with the Columbia Law 
Review).  Professor Hunter takes the view that to call Lawrence “our Brown” underappreciates the 
rhetorical power of Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the liberty right in Lawrence as compared 
with the rather miserly, if not cryptic, language used by Justice Warren in Brown.  
3. Lambda Legal, Lawrence and Garner v. Texas:  Landmark Victory!, at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=93 (last updated June 26, 2003) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
4. American Civil Liberties Union, Why the Supreme Court Decision Striking Down 
Sodomy Laws Is So Important, at  
http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRightsMain.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter ACLU]. 
5. Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights vs. Queer Theory:  What Is Left After Lawrence v. Texas, 23 
Soc. Text (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 10, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)). 
6. Nan Hunter disagrees with this assessment.  She writes that in Lawrence, “one senses that 
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in a politics that remains in dialogue with Bowers’ particular forms of 
homophobia and heterosexism.  The ACLU’s comments praising Lawrence 
provide evidence of this very problem:  “Lawrence gives us a political 
argument for all the things we want to change:  since the Constitution protects 
our relationships, the government has a moral duty to protect us when we are 
attacked because of them.”7 
The challenge after Bowers’s repudiation is to lend meaning to Lawrence, 
in particular, and sexual politics, in general, in such a way that exceeds the 
shadow of Bowers.  One way to frame this question is to ask:  How would we 
have wanted the Supreme Court to invalidate the Texas sodomy law if 
Lawrence had been the Court’s first attempt to chart the constitutional 
significance of sodomy laws?  In this respect, gay rights lawyering and 
activism has been insufficiently attentive to the palimpsestic presence of 
Bowers in the wake of Lawrence. 
I.  LAWRENCE’S PRIVATIZED LIBERTY 
Unquestionably, Lawrence is an about-face in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution’s application to the lives and practices of gay 
men and lesbians.  The Court explicitly and unequivocally repudiated its prior 
jurisprudence8 in declaring that sodomy laws violate the U.S. Constitution.  
While it was widely expected that the Court would find the Texas sodomy law 
unconstitutional, the sweeping—indeed moving—language that Justice 
Kennedy uses in the majority’s opinion came as quite a surprise.  The Texas 
statute “demeans the lives of homosexual persons,” he writes.9  The plaintiffs 
“are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.”10  This soaring language recognizes the dignity and respect that gay 
men and lesbians are due.  However, the Texas sodomy statute was not found 
to violate a constitutional right to dignity, but rather a right to liberty. 
That said, it is a curious form of liberty that Justice Kennedy reaches for 
in Lawrence.  “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places,” he writes.  “Freedom 
extends beyond spatial bounds.  Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”11  Yet the liberty principle upon which the opinion rests is less 
expansive, rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated.  It is not the 
 
this Court was removing a stain as well as a precedent.”  Hunter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 
1125–26). 
7. ACLU, supra note 4. 
8. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. 
9. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003). 
10. Id. at 2484. 
11. Id. at 2475. 
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synonym of a robust liberal concept of freedom.12 
Justice Kennedy’s use of “freedom” indicates his inclination to 
understand it as an overarching philosophical concept, a way of being that is 
made up of aggregate forms of liberty or liberties.  Thus, he begins Lawrence 
by noting that “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds,” while “[l]iberty 
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or 
other private places.”13  This conception of liberty departs, rather significantly, 
from the account of liberty relied upon by the Court in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, where in an opinion written jointly by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, 
and Souter, liberty is likened to a thick form of autonomy:  “At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could 
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.”14  Although Justice Kennedy states up front in Lawrence that “[t]he 
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more 
transcendent dimensions,”15 his reasoning depicts a more confined conception 
 
12. To resolve any confusion at the outset as to whether the case was decided on grounds of 
privacy, liberty (both as a matter of substantive due process), or equality (under the Equal 
Protection Clause), Justice Kennedy makes clear that “[t]he instant case involves liberty of the 
person.”  Id.  Indeed, the first word of the majority opinion is “[l]iberty.”  Id.  Furthermore, 
Kennedy explains that the liberty contemplated by Lawrence is in some way a subset or 
constitutive element of an expansive notion of freedom.  In the opening passage of the Lawrence 
decision, Justice Kennedy seeks to draw a distinction between liberty on the one hand and 
freedom on the other.  When discussing the relevance of non-U.S. jurisprudence, he observes that 
“[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries.”  Id. at 2483.  Further on, Justice Kennedy reasons that the 
framers did not, and could not, anticipate all the complexities of a rich conception of liberty as 
secured by the general terms of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Instead, later generations would come to understand its true nature and that over 
time people could draw from that liberty right “in their own search for greater freedom.”  Id. at 
2484.  These passages imply that the liberty Kennedy reaches for in Lawrence is a narrower 
concept than freedom.   
 What does he mean by differentiating freedom from liberty?  It is worth noting that of 
languages of European origin, both ancient and modern, only English contains both “freedom” 
and “liberty.”  Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?, 16 Pol. Theory 523, 523 
(1988).  German jurists are able to turn only to Freiheit, and the French have no choice but to 
bundle fraternité and egalité with liberté.  Political philosophers typically treat liberty and 
freedom as virtually interchangeable concepts that may be differentiated from one another 
semantically but not substantively.  Id.  Pitkin notes that freedom is more commonly used in 
prepositional phrases, while liberty is more likely to occur in the plural.  Id. at 539.  In an attempt 
to discern whether there are, in fact, deeper substantive differences between the two concepts 
beyond those of common usage, Hanna Pitkin argues that in general 
freedom is more likely to be holistic, to mean a total condition or state of being, while 
liberty is more likely to be plural and piecemeal.  Second, freedom is more likely than 
liberty to be something psychic, inner, and integral to the self . . . . [F]reedom includes 
unobstructed space and movement, even of inanimate objects, as liberty does not.   
Id. at 542. 
13. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
14. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  
15. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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of liberty than this opening line suggests. 
The cabining of Lawrence’s liberty is accomplished through its 
geographization.  Recall that while “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds,” the liberty interest at stake is one that is tethered to the domestic 
private.  Repeatedly, Justice Kennedy territorializes the right at stake as a 
liberty to engage in certain conduct in private:  “We conclude the case should 
be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to 
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”16  Precedent in the last 
half century demonstrates 
an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
matters pertaining to sex. . . . The petitioners are entitled to respect 
for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime. . . . The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest 
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.17 
The privatization of the liberty right in Lawrence is interesting on a 
number of counts.  As an initial matter, the Court chose to lodge the right at 
stake in liberty and not privacy.  Surely there were plausible privacy arguments 
that could have been made to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the Texas 
statute; indeed, one of the questions on which the Court granted certiorari was 
whether the Texas statute violated the rights to liberty and privacy.18  To be 
sure, the Court relied on some of its most fundamental privacy cases in finding 
a violation of a liberty interest in Lawrence.19  But even the Court’s privacy 
jurisprudence has evolved from addressing the disclosure of matters of private 
concern20 and governmental intrusion into private spaces21 to a less situated or 
 
16. Id. at 2476. 
17. Id. at 2480–84. 
18. “Whether Petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the 
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?”  Brief for Petitioners at i, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. (No. 02-102).  Indeed, 
the decision in Bowers was based, in part, in a rejection of “a right of privacy that extends to 
homosexual sodomy.”  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986).  The petitioners 
in Lawrence and virtually every party that submitted an amicus brief in their support argued for 
reversal on privacy grounds.  See, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 5, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. (No. 02-102); Amicus Brief of Human Rights 
Campaign et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1–2, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. (No. 10-102).  I will return 
to privacy as a grounds for securing sexual rights.  See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.  
19. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476–77 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
20. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (recognizing the right of 
“nondisclosure of private information” as constitutionally protected in the Court’s “zone of 
privacy” jurisprudence). 
21. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (noting that marriage enjoys a “right of privacy 
older than the Bill of Rights” in striking down a state statute outlawing the use of contraceptives 
by married persons). 
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territorial notion of protecting a zone of personal autonomy and decisional 
privacy.22  Early privacy law was both relational, in the sense of applying to 
the marital relationship, and spatially domesticated, in the sense of pertaining 
to activities in the most private confines of the home.23  But the Court’s 
privacy jurisprudence has evolved such that it is now concerned less with 
institutions like marriage and the home and more with personal independence.  
Lawrence’s privatized liberty appears to resuscitate a very early, more limited, 
and more institutional version of the privacy right.  To invalidate the Texas 
sodomy law, Justice Kennedy brings to bear a form of liberty that favors 
“respect for [gay men’s] private lives,”24 over “‘the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.’”25 
II.  SITUATING LAWRENCE’S LIBERTY IN A GLOBAL GAY RIGHTS CONTEXT 
At the outset of this Commentary, I suggested that we consider Lawrence 
in light of the differences between freedom, rights, and the political.  The 
Court chose to invalidate the Texas sodomy law with a particular rights 
analysis—that of privatized liberty.  The Court could have, however, chosen a 
genus of rights other than liberty on which to rest its holding.  It is worth 
asking whether a different kind of right might have opened up different 
possibilities for future legal and political action. 
South Africa’s experience with similar statutes outlawing sodomy 
provides a useful comparison.  In 1998, the South African Constitutional Court 
found that the 1957 Sexual Offenses Act, the national law criminalizing 
sodomy, violated the constitution on three theories:  equality, dignity, and 
privacy.26  The guarantee of equality in the South African Constitution goes 
beyond the rather formalist and proceduralist version embodied in U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence to include a substantive component:  “Neither 
s[ection] 8 of the interim Constitution nor s[ection] 9 of the 1996 Constitution 
 
22. In many respects, Eisenstadt marked the beginning of this shift.  In that case, the Court 
extended the privacy right enjoyed in the marital context to individuals, stating:  “If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”  405 U.S. at 453. 
23. “The Court [in Griswold] described the protected interest as a right to privacy and 
placed emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”  
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.  For a thoughtful discussion of the forms of privacy advanced by 
the Supreme Court, see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431 
(1992). 
24. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
25. Id. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
26. See Nat’l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SALR 6 
(CC) ¶¶ 14–26, 27–39.  Justice Ackermann, writing for the court, expressed a preference for the 
first two grounds upon which the Act was found unconstitutional, but noted that the “case 
illustrates how, in particular circumstances, the rights of equality and dignity are closely related, 
as are the rights of dignity and privacy.”  Id. ¶ 30. 
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envisages a passive or purely negative concept of equality; quite the 
contrary.”27  The Court recognized “that discrimination against people who are 
members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and 
harm.  Such discrimination is unfair:  it builds and entrenches inequality 
amongst different groups in our society.”28  Clearly the South African 
Constitutional Court’s invocation of an equality right in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality invites a more structural analysis of the effects of 
state-sponsored heterosexism than would the strict formalism of U.S. equality 
jurisprudence. 
Of more relevance is the court’s reasoning about dignity:  “[T]he 
constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and 
worth of all individuals as members of our society.”29  Focusing less on the 
legal fact of regulating private sexual conduct, Justice Ackermann turns the 
court’s attention to the structural effects of rendering gay men a class of 
outlaws.  “Gay men are a permanent minority in society and have suffered in 
the past from patterns of disadvantage.  The impact is severe, affecting the 
dignity, personhood and identity of gay men at a deep level.”30  Justice 
Ackermann goes on to recognize the stigmatic and other symbolic penalties 
created by the Sexual Offenses Act:  “There can be no doubt that the existence 
of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men degrades and 
devalues gay men in our broader society.”31  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy 
also recognizes the stigmatic consequences of sodomy laws, but does so in a 
manner far more narrow than Justice Ackermann in National Coalition.  
Kennedy notes the stigma caused by criminal convictions, while Ackermann 
ties the stigma to the mere existence of sodomy laws, whether or not they are 
being enforced and convictions are obtained on their behalf.  As Nan Hunter 
notes, “[s]odomy laws have been most frequently enforced indirectly, not 
directly, by the denial of custody or other parental rights to gay parents or by 
exclusions from certain jobs . . . even though the litigants had never been 
convicted of illegal conduct.”32 
While Justice Ackermann found the Sexual Offenses Act unconstitutional 
on equality, dignity, and privacy grounds, he clearly found the privacy 
argument the least compelling of the three.  First, in discussing the privacy 
claim, he begins by acknowledging both the drawbacks and limitations of the 
privacy argument as it tends to reinforce the idea that sodomy is something to 
 
27. Id. ¶ 16. 
28. Id. (quoting Brink v. Kitshoff NO, 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC) ¶ 42). 
29. Id. ¶ 28. 
30. Id. ¶ 26(a).  Note that in declaring invalid the omission of “sexual orientation” as a 
ground for illegal discrimination in an Albertan statute, the Canadian Supreme Court invoked a 
theory of dignity grounded in the constitution (Charter) as well.  See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 
S.C.R. 493, ¶ 104. 
31. Nat’l Coalition, 1999 (1) SALR ¶ 28. 
32. Hunter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 1131). 
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be shamefully hidden in the confines of the private bedroom.33  Second, and 
more importantly, Justice Ackermann concludes his long treatment of the 
various grounds upon which the Sexual Offenses Act violated the South 
African Constitution by offering a hypothetical that he believes manifestly 
demonstrates the absurdly discriminatory purpose and impact of the sodomy 
law: 
A gay couple attend [sic] a social gathering attended by gay, lesbian 
and heterosexual couples.  The gay man, in the presence of other 
guests, kisses his gay partner on the mouth in a way “calculated to 
stimulate” both his and his partner’s “sexual passion” and to give 
both “sexual gratification”.  They do no more.  A lesbian and a 
heterosexual couple do exactly the same.  The gay couple are [sic] 
guilty of an offence.  The lesbian and heterosexual couples are not.34 
What is remarkable about this hypothetical is the degree to which its absurdity 
does not depend on a conception of privacy.  The kiss is in public, in front of 
an audience, and is explicitly erotic in nature.  It is the disparate legal treatment 
of similarly situated kissers that strikes Justice Ackermann as absurd and 
unfair, not the location in which the same-sex kissing takes place. 
By reading the dignity right in light of an equality right, the court in 
National Coalition was able to articulate the constitutional infirmity of the 
Sexual Offenses Act in a way that differs substantially from what the Court 
accomplished in Lawrence.  While Justice Ackermann foregrounds equality 
and dignity and backgrounds privacy in his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
foregrounds privacy, backgrounds dignity, and rejects the equality argument 
altogether.  With a change of emphasis, Justice Kennedy could have made 
Lawrence turn on a recognition of how sodomy laws inflict a badge of 
inferiority, indeed a badge of the closet,35 on gay men and lesbians.  
The course of South African constitutional jurisprudence since National 
Coalition teaches that the privatized liberty of Lawrence is indeed something 
about which concern is appropriate.  In Jordan v. State,36 decided four years 
after National Coalition, the South African Constitutional Court was 
confronted with a constitutional challenge to a statute that criminalized 
prostitution on the ground that it interfered with economic activity, violated the 
privacy rights of sex workers, and discriminated against sex workers as 
compared with their customers.  The sex workers in the case relied upon 
National Coalition in arguing that the statute inflicted stigma and social 
opprobrium on sex workers in ways quite similar to the dignity harm inflicted 
upon gay men by the Sexual Offenses Act.37  The Constitutional Court found 
the sodomy analogy inapposite and refused to extend the equality or dignity 
analysis of National Coalition to sex workers, preferring instead to analyze the 
 
33. Nat’l Coalition, 1999 (1) SALR ¶ 29. 
34. Id. ¶ 75. 
35. Conversations with Jeremy Waldron suggested the concept of a badge of the closet.  
36. 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC). 
37. Id. ¶ 27. 
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case under a privacy theory:  “[T]he prostitute invites the public generally to 
come and engage in unlawful conduct in private”;38 therefore, the activity at 
interest did not implicate privacy.  Given the commercial nature of the sex and 
the fact that the appellants were not intimately related to the men with whom 
they had sex, the dignity and privacy concerns that animated the sodomy case 
were inapplicable. Thus we see how the privacy argument that had been 
backgrounded in National Coalition is foregrounded in Jordan and pressed 
into service to distinguish the kind of sexual rights claim asserted by sex 
workers from that asserted by respectable gay men and lesbians. 
To a troubling degree, the privacy dimension of Jordan and the privatized 
liberty of Lawrence leave lower courts free to cabin protection of, and thus 
interpret, nonnormative sexualities in ways similar to Stanley v. Georgia,39 in 
which the Court tolerated obscenity at the price of demeaning it, characterizing 
it as “a base thing that should nonetheless be tolerated so long as it takes place 
in private.”40  The work done by the public/private distinction in Jordan may 
portend a Stanley-like treatment of privacy and privatized liberty rights for 
nonnormative sexualities:  Unless they are expressed in respectable private 
contexts, they may not seek refuge in the Constitution.  As the Court in Bowers 
pointed out, “Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected 
outside the home, and it partially prevented the enforcement of state obscenity 
laws . . . .”41  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence not only fails to 
repudiate this part of Bowers, but Kennedy’s privatized liberty leaves a wide 
range of homosexual and heterosexual behaviors and “lifestyles”42 subject to 
criminalization.  It is hard to imagine Justice Kennedy using as an example the 
public display of explicitly erotic same sex behavior to illustrate the right at 
issue in Lawrence—recall Justice Ackermann’s gay men kissing at a party.  
Indeed, he could not, given how he re-closets Lawrence and Garner’s 
constitutional right in the hidden domain of the private. 
Jordan suggests another reason to be wary of the narrow privatized liberty 
right announced in Lawrence.  Recall that Justice Kennedy takes it as given 
that the sex between John Lawrence and Tyron Garner took place within the 
context of a relationship.  With respect to the right to make decisions about 
intimate affiliations in private settings, Justice Kennedy notes that “[p]ersons 
in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as 
heterosexual persons do,”43 and that the statutes at issue in Lawrence and in 
Bowers “seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
 
38. Id. ¶ 28. 
39. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
40. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:  Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 537 (1989). 
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986). 
42. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (“The case does involve two 
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to 
a homosexual lifestyle.” (emphasis added)). 
43. Id. at 2482. 
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formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.”44  Note that the analogy here is between persons 
in a homosexual relationship and heterosexual persons.45  Thus, the issue in 
Lawrence, as well as in Bowers, was not the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct—that, says Kennedy, would be demeaning to John Lawrence and 
Tyron Garner.  They would be disgraced just as a married couple would be if 
the claim were made that “marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse.”46  Kennedy writes that “[sexual conduct] can be but one element 
in a personal bond that is more enduring.”47  More enduring than what?  Than 
sex? 
In two paragraphs, Justice Kennedy does a thorough job of domesticating 
John Lawrence and Tyron Garner—Lawrence an older white man, Garner a 
younger black man, who for all we know from the opinion, might have just 
been tricking with each other.  Did they even know each other’s names at the 
point police entered Lawrence’s apartment?  Did they plan on seeing each 
other again?  None of these facts is in the record, none of the briefing in the 
case indicated that they were in a relationship.  Nevertheless, the Court took it 
as given that Lawrence and Garner were in a relationship, and the fact of that 
relationship does important normative work in the opinion.  Remember, sex is 
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. 
Just as the Court’s earlier Bowers decision and the military’s “don’t ask, 
don’t tell”48 policy overdetermined gay men and lesbians in sexual terms, we 
now celebrate a victory that at its heart underdetermines, if not writes out 
entirely, our sexuality.  Previously, when courts considered the legal status of 
gay men, they approached the specter of homosexual sex with a horror 
ordinarily reserved for incest cases.49  Now gay men are portrayed as 
domesticated creatures, settling down into marital-like relationships in which 
they can both cultivate and nurture desires for exclusivity, fidelity, and 
longevity in place of other more explicitly erotic desires.  “The instant case 
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent 
 
44. Id. at 2478. 
45. My colleague Kendall Thomas has read the asymmetry of this language in Lawrence 
through a lens that foregrounds its heteronormativity.  See Kendall Thomas, Remarks for AALS 
Panel on Lawrence v. Texas (Jan. 4, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
46. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
47. Id. 
48. National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). 
49. Judith Butler uses Sophocles’ Antigone to explore the ways in which alternative kinship 
arrangements tend to provoke psychic revulsion or horror in the psychically “normal” reader: 
Consider that the horror of incest, the moral revulsion it compels in some, is not that far 
afield from the same horror and revulsion felt toward lesbian and gay sex . . . . The various 
modes in which the oedipal mandate fails to produce normative family all risk entering 
into the metonymy of that moralized sexual horror that is perhaps most fundamentally 
associated with incest. 
Judith P. Butler, Antigone’s Claim:  Kinship Between Life and Death 71 (2000). 
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dimensions,” writes Justice Kennedy.50  We come to learn later in the opinion 
that by “spatial” he means private, and by “transcendent” he means to refer to 
relationship-based intimacy.  The price of the victory in Lawrence has been to 
trade sexuality for domesticity—a high price indeed, and a difficult spot from 
which to build a politics of sexuality.  As Teemu Ruskola has observed, 
Kennedy’s opinion “leaves little or no justification for protecting less-than-
transcendental sex that is not part of an on-going relationship.”51 
Again, the sexuality jurisprudence of another jurisdiction is instructive 
with respect to the horizons Lawrence at once opens up and forecloses.  In a 
1981 case, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,52 the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) ruled that Northern Ireland’s sodomy law violated Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights53 to the extent that it amounted to 
“an unjustified interference with [Dudgeon’s] right to respect for his private 
life.”54  Fifteen years later, in the Spanner case, the ECHR refused to extend 
the ruling in Dudgeon to invalidate the criminal conviction of three adult men 
who had engaged in consensual sadomasochistic sex in private.55  Although 
the activities the men engaged in “were conducted in private for no apparent 
purpose other than the achievement of sexual gratification,”56 the court ruled 
that the law of assault could not admit adults’ consent to sadomasochistic sex.  
In finding that the privacy provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights were not violated by the applicants’ convictions, the court 
was forced to distinguish Dudgeon.  So too, the court had to contend with an 
earlier British case, R. v. Wilson,57 in which the Court of Appeal reversed the 
assault conviction of a man who had, with his wife’s consent, branded his 
initials with a hot knife on his wife’s buttocks, reasoning that “Mrs. Wilson not 
only consented to that which the appellant did, she instigated it.  There was no 
aggressive intent on the part of the appellant.”58  The Spanner court found 
Wilson inapplicable:  “Consensual activity between husband and wife, in the 
 
50. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2474. 
51. Ruskola, supra note 5 (manuscript at 7).  
52. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 1 (1981). 
53. (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.8, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. 
54. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25. 
55. Laskey v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997).  The case is commonly 
referred to as the Spanner case because the Manchester Police arrested the defendants in a raid as 
part of “Operation Spanner.” 
56. Id. at 41–42. 
57. 1997 Q.B. 47 (Eng. C.A.). 
58. Id. at 50. 
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privacy of the matrimonial home, is not, in our judgment, a proper matter for 
criminal investigation, let alone criminal prosecution.”59  In the end, it did not 
matter to the court that the Spanner defendants’ activities took place in 
private60 or that all of the conduct was consensual.  Rather, what rendered the 
conduct regulable was the fact that the participants either were or could have 
been physically injured.  Notwithstanding the important value placed on 
protecting private life, the court reasoned that state interference with private 
activities could be justified on the ground of protecting health.  By contrast, 
without much in the way of explanation, the ECHR concluded that neither 
health nor morals were at stake when Mr. Wilson branded his initials on Mrs. 
Wilson’s buttocks. 
Three years later, the ECHR had to grapple once more with the legal 
status of nonnormative sexual behaviors when British police executed a search 
warrant in the home of a “practicing homosexual” and seized, among other 
things, video tapes showing him engaging in sexual activities with up to four 
other adult men in his home.61  Based on the acts depicted in the video tapes, 
the man, A.D.T., was charged with gross indecency between men under the 
1956 Sexual Offenses Act.  A.D.T. claimed that his privacy rights had been 
abridged and relied, in significant part, on the ECHR’s earlier Dudgeon 
decision.  Finding no threat to public health or likelihood that the videos would 
make their way into the public domain, the court concluded that “the activities 
were therefore genuinely ‘private’”62 and that the prosecution violated 
A.D.T.’s privacy rights.  In A.D.T., the ECHR chose not to rest its privacy 
holding on the decisional autonomy norm they relied upon in Wilson, for that 
would have created problems for their earlier Spanner decision.  Instead they 
reached for a spatial conception of privacy, excusing the nonnormative sexual 
practices that A.D.T. indulged in as unlikely to gain a public audience. 
The lesson of the ECHR’s recent sexual privacy jurisprudence is that 
rather raunchy forms of sex can be insulated from governmental regulation if 
they take place within a marriage or, absent a marriage or other sanctioned 
relationship, if they in no way threaten to seep into public view. If cases like 
these were to come before the United States Supreme Court now, of the three, 
a case with A.D.T.-like facts would likely come out differently.  The sex at 
issue in A.D.T. was not an expression of an enduring bond, and it did not take 
place in the context of a relationship.  Indeed, there was nothing about it that 
evokes the warm, fuzzy, domesticated backdrop of Lawrence.  It was just sex.  
Lawrence, most likely, would provide those men little comfort. 
Having said all this, let me be clear about one thing:  Decriminalization of 
sodomy is no small thing, and I do not seek to minimize the significance of this 
 
59. Laskey, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 46 (quoting Wilson, 1997 Q.B. at 50). 
60. Id. (“[I]n our judgement, it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public.” 
(quoting Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980), [1981] Q.B. 715, 719 (Eng. C.A.))). 
61. A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 803 (2001). 
62. Id. at 811. 
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aspect of Lawrence.  Rather, my concern is with what the decision in Lawrence 
opens up and shuts down for nonnormative sexual identities—where does it 
take us next and what arguments are enabled and foreclosed by Lawrence’s 
reasoning?  Lawrence puts an end to the interpellation of gay male and lesbian 
couples as criminals based upon their private sexual conduct.  But what kind of 
legal and political subjectivity does Lawrence announce for us? 
III.  LAWRENCE’S LIBERTY AND GAY RIGHTS POLITICS 
To ask the question in this way is to recognize that decriminalization does 
not necessarily mobilize any particular ethical projects, or for that matter, any 
ethics at all.  Rather, decriminalization merely disables a form of public 
regulation of private adult activity.  Indeed, it neither sanctions nor suggests 
any alternative form of legitimization.  So too, it does not render viable any 
particular kind of sexual politics or political legibility.63  Without more, 
Lawrence-like decriminalization merely signals a public tolerance of the 
behavior, so long as it takes place in private and between two consenting adults 
in a relationship. 
If only these concerns about the limited utility of Lawrence were an 
overreaction on my part.  But it took no time for lower courts to read Lawrence 
in the limited terms I have suggested.  The day after the Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Lawrence, it vacated a Kansas appellate court decision, Limon v. 
Kansas, and sent it back to the Kansas Court of Appeals for further 
consideration.64  Matthew Limon, an eighteen-year old man,65 had been 
 
63. By political legibility, I mean the ways in which subjects become visible and are 
rendered viable as citizens, as parties who can make demands on the state, and are otherwise 
regarded as both making up and speaking to a range of publics.  For an elaboration of the notion 
of “publics,” see Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (2002), at 
http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-pub-cult/backissues/pc36/warner.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review).  As Warner sketches it out: 
The public is a kind of social totality.  Its most common sense is that of the people in 
general.  It might be the people organized as the nation, the commonwealth, the city, the 
state, or some other community.  It might be very general, as in Christendom or humanity.  
But in each case the public, as a people, is thought to include everyone within the field in 
question.  This sense of totality is brought out in speaking of the public, even though to 
speak of a national public implies that others exist; there must be as many publics as 
polities, but whenever one is addressed as the public, the others are assumed not to matter. 
A public can also be a second thing:  a concrete audience, a crowd witnessing itself in 
visible space, as with a theatrical public.  Such a public also has a sense of totality, 
bounded by the event or by the shared physical space.  A performer on stage knows where 
her public is, how big it is, where its boundaries are, and what the time of its common 
existence is.  A crowd at a sports event, a concert, or a riot might be a bit blurrier around 
the edges, but still knows itself by knowing where and when it is assembled in common 
visibility and common action.  
Id. 
64. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003). 
65. The act took place a week after his eighteenth birthday.  State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 
243 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting). 
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convicted of having had oral sex one time with a fourteen-year old boy in a 
school for developmentally disabled children that they both attended.  Kansas 
law punishes homosexual sex with a minor much more harshly than 
heterosexual sex with a minor.66  Indeed, Limon received a sentence of more 
than seventeen years, thirteen times longer than he would have received if he 
had had sex with an underage female.  The differential penalties based on the 
sexual identity of the defendant seemed like a prime target for the newly 
minted Lawrence decision. 
Not so, said the Kansas Court of Appeals on remand.  The major premise 
of the Lawrence decision, writes the Kansas court, is that “[a]ll adults may 
legally engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual 
lifestyle.”67  Thus, Lawrence had no application to the Kansas statute as it did 
not involve adults.  What is more, the court notes, the preference the statute 
gives to different-sex sexual activity is justified on the grounds that the state 
has no interest in protecting same-sex sex, while it has a fundamental interest 
in heterosexual sex:  “Throughout history, governments have extolled the 
virtues of procreation as a way to furnish new workers, soldiers, and other 
useful members of society.  The survival of society requires a continuous 
replenishment of its members. . . . [S]exual acts between same-sex couples do 
not lead to procreation on their own.”68  So too, sexual contact between 
persons of different sexes can lead to unwanted pregnancies, thus “[t]he 
legislature could well have concluded that incarcerating the young adult parent 
for a long period would be counterproductive to the requirement that a parent 
has a duty to provide support to his or her minor child.”69 
Limon makes clear how some lower courts may understand Lawrence to 
impose absolutely no check on the legal enforcement of heteronormative 
preferences.  Lawrence has no application to sex unrelated to childbearing, sex 
that might lead to childrearing obligations, and sex that involves a minor (even 
if that sex would be treated far less harshly if it had taken place between 
persons of different sexes).  Indeed, Lawrence also offers little to those who 
 
66. Kansas has a so-called “Romeo and Juliet” law that makes the penalty for statutory rape 
less severe when the case involves two teenagers.  The “Romeo and Juliet” law reads: 
(a) Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is engaging in voluntary:  (1) sexual intercourse; 
(2) sodomy; or (3) lewd fondling or touching with a child who is 14 years of age but less 
than 16 years of age and the offender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years 
of age older than the child and the child and the offender are the only parties involved and 
are members of the opposite sex. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3522(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).  Limon was sentenced to 206 months 
in prison followed by sixty additional months of postrelease supervision, and he must register as a 
sex offender.  Had he had sex with a female, he would have received a fifteen-month sentence.  
Limon, 83 P.3d at 243 (Pierron, J., dissenting). 
67. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234. 
68. Id. at 237. 
69. Id.  At least in Kansas, Lawrence did nothing to unsettle Bowers’s declaration that there 
is no “connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual 
activity on the other.”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
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seek to invalidate fornication or adultery laws.70  In this respect, the limitations 
of Lawrence’s domesticated liberty should be of equal concern to those who 
seek to engage in nonnormative heterosexual behavior. 
There is no denying that rights in general, and liberty in particular, are 
something we cannot not want, to borrow a concept from Gayatri Spivak.71  
But rights, particularly in the form articulated in Lawrence, cannot exhaust our 
political projects.  Lawrence recognizes, in a manner far more robust than 
Romer v. Evans,72 that homosexuals are rights-bearing subjects.  But the 
political agenda leveraged by that recognition does not exceed honor of the 
domesticated private.  The most likely project to be launched from this 
conception of subjectivity is, of course, marriage.73  And, of course, that’s 
exactly what Lawrence has unleashed.  Less than six months after the Supreme 
Court issued the Lawrence decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
found that Massachusetts’s refusal to license same-sex marriage was 
unconstitutional, and in so finding it relied very heavily upon Lawrence.74  For 
a short period thereafter, gay and lesbian couples overwhelmed public officials 
in a handful of cities demanding marriage licenses.  The relevant officials in 
San Francisco, New Paltz, and a couple of other jurisdictions accommodated 
those demands and married thousands of gay and lesbian couples.  As such, the 
subjects of gay and lesbian political organizing at this moment have become 
same-sex couples, not persons who seek nonnormative kinship formations or 
individuals who engage in nonnormative sex.   
But it is wrong to understand the fight for gay marriage as a fight for 
sexual freedom or, for that matter, relationship-based freedom.  Marriage is not 
a freedom.  Rather, it is a power understood in Hohfeldian terms, and as a 
power it is the less interesting pouvoir, not puissance.  The states have created 
a civil status called marriage, just as the states have created voting criteria and 
rights to inheritance.  One either is or is not the kind of person to whom the 
state has given the power to enter into a civil marriage, to exercise the vote, or 
 
70. None of the Supreme Court’s privacy or liberty jurisprudence has served as the basis 
upon which to invalidate fornication laws.  See State v. Lutz, 272 A.2d 753 (N.J. 1971); Robert 
A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity of Statute Making Adultery and Fornication Criminal 
Offenses, 41 A.L.R.3d 1338 (1972).  Nan Hunter reads the opinion differently, insofar as she 
understands it to delink sex and marriage.  See Hunter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 1110).  In this 
regard, Hunter does not understand the Court to be domesticating homosex in the ways that 
Ruskola and I do. 
71. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine 46 (1993). 
72. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
73. It is worth noting that the use of marriage-related legal reforms launched by Lawrence to 
aid efforts to legalize same-sex marriage have, so far, had mixed results.  In Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court relied, in part, on Lawrence in holding that the Commonwealth’s prohibition of 
same-sex marriages violated the Massachusetts Constitution, whereas Lawrence was of no help in 
a challenge to marriage laws in Arizona.  Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of 
Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 456–58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
74. The court’s opinion begins with three citations to Lawrence.  See Goodridge, 798 
N.E.2d at 948. 
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to inherit property.  One has the power, not the freedom, to marry, to vote, and 
to inherit property.  Borrowing Hohfeld’s notions of legal liberty and legal 
liability, Carl Wellman has written:  “[W]hat the same-sex couple lacks is not a 
legal liberty of marrying one another [in a state that does not allow same-sex 
marriage] but a legal liability of being married to each other.”75  The state 
creates rules and conventions that govern these sorts of powers, and the denial 
of the ability to participate does not trammel upon a fundamental freedom, 
understood in traditional liberal terms.  To the extent that same-sex couples are 
denied the ability to marry, that denial best surfaces in law as a problem of 
equality, of indefensible differential treatment, but not as a matter of 
freedom.76  Refusing to adopt the rhetoric of freedom, Judith Butler has more 
aptly articulated what is at stake in the movement for gay marriage:  “The 
petition for marriage rights seeks to solicit state recognition for 
nonheterosexual unions, and so configures the state as withholding an 
entitlement that it really should distribute in a nondiscriminatory way, 
regardless of sexual orientation.”77 
I fear that Lawrence and the gay rights organizing that has taken place in 
and around it have created a path dependency that privileges privatized and 
domesticated rights and legal liabilities, while rendering less viable projects 
that advance nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and sexuality.  Judith 
Butler has voiced a similar concern with respect to the gravitational pull of 
same-sex marriage, to the extent that it fails to “attend to the foreclosure of the 
possible that takes place when, from the urgency to stake a political claim, one 
naturalizes the options that figure most legibly within the sexual field.”78  So 
too, Lauren Berlant has challenged us to think critically about “why, when 
there are so many people, only one plot counts as ‘life’ (first comes love, 
then . . .)?  Those who don’t or can’t find their way into that story—the queers, 
the single, the something else—can become so easily unimaginable, even often 
to themselves.”79 
It is not only gay men and lesbians who have a stake in exploring why 
only one plot counts, why a successful adult life requires life-long 
commitment, and through what means our desires for intimacy and domesticity 
 
75. Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights:  Persons Under Laws, Institutions, and Morals 87 
(1985). 
76. Nevertheless, the same-sex marriage movement has termed its cause and its principal 
organizations working on the issue “freedom to marry.”  See, e.g., California Freedom to Marry 
Coalition, at http://www.civilmarriage.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Freedom to Marry, at http://www.freedomtomarry.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Freedom to Marry Coalition of Massachusetts, at 
http://www.equalmarriage.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force, at http://www.vtfreetomarry.org (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
77. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in Left Legalism/Left Critique 
229, 230–31 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
78. Id. at 235. 
79. Lauren Berlant, Intimacy:  A Special Issue, 24 Critical Inquiry 281, 286 (1998). 
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are cultivated to the point that alternatives seem like failure, dysfunction, or are 
unthinkable.  “Everybody wants love.  Everybody wants it to last forever,” 
declared Susan Ager, a lesbian columnist for the Detroit Free Press.80  
Lawrence and the political action that has followed in its wake have 
contributed to a notion that everyone wants the same thing, and that that thing 
is unproblematic.  Elizabeth Povinelli has challenged us to question the 
institutional forces that have normalized certain forms of kinship, such that it is 
taken for granted that healthy self-elaboration and personal transcendence must 
take place in the context of an intimate, domestic couple.81  Nevertheless, the 
gay and lesbian movement has become captive to leaders who advance the 
view that there “is no other way for gay people to be fully equal to non-gay 
people—both in the eyes of the law, and in the eyes of the larger community—
than to participate in the same legal institution using the same language. . . . 
Any alternative to marriage is not marriage.  Anything less, is less than 
equal!”82 
Lawrence is a slam dunk victory for a politics that is exclusively devoted 
to creating safe zones for homo- and hetero-sex/intimacy, while at the same 
time rendering all other zones more dangerous for nonnormative sex.  It can be 
used to float political projects that render certain normative heterosexual 
couples as its primary reference points and ethical paradigms.  Lawrence and 
the ethics from which it evolved do little to open up new forms of public and 
private sexual intelligibility that are not always already domestinormative.83  
The landscape post-Lawrence is not one that makes formal legal distinctions 
between heterosexual and homosexual practices, but rather one that likely 
renders different legal treatment to those who express their sexuality in 
domesticated ways and those who don’t—regardless of orientation.  The world 
post-Lawrence remains invested in forms of social membership and, indeed, 
citizenship that are structurally identified with domesticated heterosexual 
marriage and intimacy.  Lawrence offers us no tools to investigate “kinds of 
intimacy [and sex] that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to 
kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation.”84  In this regard, the 
 
80. Susan Ager, The Mayor Shows Heart in San Francisco, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 17, 
2004, at 1E, available at http://www.freep.com/features/living/ager17_20040217.htm (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
81. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Notes on Gridlock:  Genealogy, Intimacy, Sexuality, 14 Pub. 
Culture 215, 231 (2002). 
82. Marriage Equality California & Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Roadmap 
to Equality:  A Freedom to Marry Educational Guide 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/122.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (emphasis in original). 
83. I use this rather awkward neologism because “heteronormative” no longer describes the 
preferences that punish, exile, or erase persons who fail to emulate a marital model. 
84. Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, 24 Critical Inquiry 547, 558 (1998).  
As if the liberty principle in Lawrence were in any respect ambiguous, Justice Kennedy seeks to 
reassure his colleagues and the public that with this opinion he is not ushering in a new era of 
sexual politics: 
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who might be 
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opinion’s implications are at once modest and quite broad in scope.  The legal 
program that is most easily suggested by Lawrence is one undertaken by adult 
gay couples who seek recognition for their relationships and whose sexuality is 
not merely backgrounded, but closeted behind the closed doors of the 
bedroom.  This is a project devoted to celebrating our relationships; it is not a 
project of sexual rights or the politics of sexuality.  Indeed, against this framing 
of the “gay agenda,” the heterosexual reproductive rights cases start looking 
pretty darn radical.  In this sense, overreliance on Lawrence risks 
domesticating our rights, our sex, and our politics, and charting us down a path 
of domestinormative sexual citizenship.  The political subjects it predetermines 
are husbands and wives, and the legal projects it maps out do not extend 
beyond gay marriage.   
The lessons of the black civil rights movement instruct that political 
movements should exercise caution in overidentifying their objectives with the 
terms and scope of advances made in the legal arena.  While there is some 
truth to the celebration of Lawrence as the gay community’s Brown, one would 
hope that this is not so in every respect.  The legal and rhetorical moves that 
the Brown Court deemed necessary to reverse Plessy v. Ferguson were quickly 
revealed as ill-equipped to provide prospective racial justice in any systematic 
way, and indeed yielded to toothless legal formalism within a matter of a few 
years.85  Nevertheless, many precincts of the movement for racial justice 
overvalued the formal legal desegregation agenda set in motion by Brown.  At 
the same time, other activists pursued political goals that were not necessarily 
charted by Brown’s normative frame.  This experience, while not unique to the 
struggle for African American rights in the United States, illustrates how law 
has a particular power to shape the agendas and desires of movements that 
figure rights as one of their principal objectives.86  While legal narratives of 
rights unfolding in successive judicial opinions are constrained by the pulls of 
 
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused.  It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.  It does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 
seek to enter.  The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners 
are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.   
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003). 
85. For commentary on the limits of Brown, see Derrick Bell, Dissenting, in What Brown v. 
Board of Education Should Have Said:  The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s 
Landmark Civil Rights Decision (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2001); Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, 
Brown at 50:  King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? (Jan. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
86. See Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society:  The Social Construction of Victims 
(1988); Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:  
From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753 (1994). 
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doctrinal coherence and fidelity to precedent, no such constraints govern the 
normative scope of the political.87  In this sense, the gay community’s political 
projects post-Lawrence necessarily take place in the shadow of Bowers, but 
they owe it no fealty. 
Lawrence announces that the criminalization of same-sex sodomy is 
unconstitutional because it interferes with gay people’s right to enter into 
serious domestic relationships, but that should not be taken to define the 
political dimension of sexuality or sexual citizenship.  Sex gets figured, if at 
all, in Lawrence as instrumental to the formation of intimate relationships—it 
seems not to have a social or legal status in its own right.  As a result, sexual 
rights qua sexual are exiled from the legal struggle on behalf of gay men and 
lesbians. 
Considering Lawrence from another vantage point, one could understand 
the Court’s pre-Lawrence jurisprudence as a form of hate speech—
constitutionalizing and underwriting the power of a form of address that both 
labeled and constituted us abjectly.  To be sure, Lawrence signals the 
emergence of a new social existence for gays and lesbians.  No longer will gay 
men and lesbians be interpellated in strict Althusserian terms as sodomites.  
This new social existence should not, however, be understood as a true, free 
nature being revealed now that the false and defamatory moniker “sodomite” 
has been constitutionally enjoined.  Rather, gays and lesbians are subject to a 
new manner of address that in turn constitutes gay and lesbian subjects in 
terms set by that address.  In Lawrence, gays are no longer recognized as 
sodomitic outlaws, but instead as civilized domestic subjects.88  Thus the 
horror of Bowers, expressed as hate speech, is exchanged in Lawrence for 
tolerance, if not respect, for a mimetically domesticated gay.  It is vital that we 
bear in mind that state recognition does not merely impose legal order on 
“facts in the world.”  State ordering actually brings those facts into being in a 
range of ways, whether it be how individuals come to understand themselves in 
the shadow of law,89 by and through the law’s summons, or by the state’s 
creation of explicit and implicit incentive systems.  While all this can be said 
 
87. For a discussion of the ways in which law can crowd out extra-legal strategies for social 
change, see Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, The “Lure of Litigation” and Other Myths 
About Movement Lawyers in the United States, in Cause Lawyering:  Rights Politics and 
Professional Responsibility (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1997). 
88. The ECHR affirmed the criminal prosecution of gay men who engaged in 
sadomasochistic sex, in part, on the grounds that “[s]ociety is entitled and bound to protect itself 
against a cult of violence.  Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing.  Cruelty is 
uncivilized.”  Laskey v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 43 (1997). 
89. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:  Single Women and the Legal 
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 Yale L.J. 1641 (2003) (explaining that women 
outside the legal boundaries of marriage have nonetheless been regulated by its normative 
framework); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (noting that divorce law provides a framework in 
which private couples can form their own private ordering regarding post-divorce rights and 
responsibilities). 
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of identity, it can also be said of the desires these subjects both experience and 
express.  The present stampede toward marriage in the gay community 
provides ample evidence for a healthy suspicion of the ways in which state 
ordering itself fuels, if not creates, desiring subjects. 
What I find remarkable about much of the leadership in the l/g/b/t 
community—a fact that led it to exalt the Lawrence decision—is the yearning 
for official recognition.  There is a fascination with law, with registration, and 
with demands for the state to both see gay people and to govern them in ways 
that fall within the peculiar repertoire of state governance.  In this sense, many 
leaders in the gay community have exchanged one form of desire for another:  
The kind of desire that got John Lawrence and Tryon Garner into trouble in the 
first place has been parlayed into a desire of a different kind—a desire to marry 
and a desire for homosexual couples to be recognized by law and legal 
authorities, not to mention caterers, tuxedo rental shops, and wedding planners.  
The path away from illegitimacy in criminal law seems to lead immediately 
and exclusively toward legitimization through civil law.  Yet the complexities 
of simultaneously exchanging one form of legal regulation of homosexuality 
for another play almost no role in contemporary gay political discourse.  What 
these l/g/b/t leaders somehow fail to appreciate is that gay and lesbian subjects 
are constituted by and through their manner of address, by and through the way 
they are recognized, registered, and brought within the jurisdiction of the state.  
That jurisdiction used to be criminal.  Now it’s civil in nature. 
How has this come to be?  How has this become a community that 
privileges recognition so highly, and seems to have abandoned some of the 
more radical strategies and goals grounded in a politics that sought to 
destabilize dominant forms of sexuality and kinship, rather than seeking to be 
stabilized by them?90 Might there be something politically valuable in resisting 
the transformation of the gay political subject from pervert to domesticated 
couple?  What political projects are foreclosed by the vilification of the notion 
of perversion in the gay community?  Why have the gaining of rights and the 
politics of recognition been substituted for earlier political goals in the gay 
community that were committed to making viable a range of sexual and kin 
affiliations other than those that are narrowly domestinormative? 
One answer turns, I think, on the prominence of lawyers and legal 
strategies in modern l/g/b/t organizing.  Lawyers privilege the problem of legal 
classification—looking to law as at once the source of our oppression and the 
key to our liberation.  That is to say, the harm suffered by gays and lesbians 
 
90. Here, I am thinking about the early homophile movement led, in part, by Harry Hay as 
well as the feminist sexual radicals of the late 1970s and early 1980s, all of whom sought a more 
radical sexual politics than that imagined today.  See generally John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, 
Sexual Communities (1983); Pleasure and Danger:  Exploring Female Sexuality (Carole S. Vance 
ed., 1984).  This legacy has been taken up and further developed more recently by authors such as 
Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal:  Sex Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (2000); 
Leo Bersani, Homos (1995); Berlant & Warner, supra note 84; and writers in the Special Issue on 
Intimacy in volume 24 of Critical Inquiry (1998). 
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pre-Lawrence was understood as a problem of misrecognition, of their legal 
misclassification as sodomites.  When you dispatch a bunch of lawyers to 
address the problem, the solution is to force law to classify us correctly.  This 
move gives us two choices:  first, to demand that law refocus its gaze such that 
we are seen accurately rather than through the distorting lens of intolerance.  
Under this account we get figured in law as victims who turn to law to remedy 
instances of social misrecognition that result in losing our jobs, our homes, our 
children, etc.  This account risks our identification as victims.91 
Alternatively, we make the move that any legal distinction is 
illegitimate—the homo equivalent of colorblind thinking in the racial equality 
context.  In effect, this is the road down which Lawrence travels.  The 
orientation-blindness that underwrites this normative project at once accepts 
and erases the heteronormativity that is its underlying premise.  Our 
relationships are to be treated just as straight people’s are, only to the extent 
that our relations mimic theirs.  Their relationships remain the normative 
baseline for considering which rights we might enjoy. 
Why would we take it as a priori true that the expansion of rights 
necessarily promises greater freedom?  What do we risk when our political 
agenda sets a horizon that has no greater depth of field than securing legal 
rights and recognition by the state?  In this regard, we have something to learn 
from the experiences of African Americans who became rights-bearing 
subjects and who gained the power to legally marry for the first time in the 
period immediately following the close of the Civil War. 
IV.  HISTORICAL DILEMMAS OF MARRIAGE AND FREEDOM 
Given their legal status as chattel and not persons, enslaved couples in the 
antebellum South did not have the power to enter into legally enforceable 
marriages.92  Just as gays and lesbians have done, enslaved people 
nevertheless lived together as husband and wife after undertaking wedding 
celebrations as simple as jumping over a broomstick,93 or as elaborate as a 
 
91. Wendy Brown’s work on “wounded attachments” both captures and critiques this 
posture quite thoroughly, as does Patchen Markell’s new work.  Wendy Brown, States of Injury:  
Power and Freedom in Late Modernity 52–76 (1995); Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition 
(2003). 
92. “[W]e are deprived of every thing that hath a tendency to make life even tolerable, the 
endearing ties of husband and wife we are strangers to for we are no longer man and wife than 
our masters or mistresses thinkes proper marred or onmarred.”  Petition to the Governor, the 
Council, and the House of Representatives of Massachusetts (May 25, 1774), reprinted in 1 
Herbert Apetheker, American Negro Slave Revolts 8–9 (1943), quoted in Peggy Cooper Davis, 
Neglected Stories:  The Constitution and Family Values 109 (1997). 
93. See Herbert G. Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925, at 275–
77 (1979); Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long:  The Aftermath of Slavery 240 (1979); 
Ann Patton Malone, Sweet Chariot:  Slave Family and Household Structure in Nineteenth-
Century Louisiana 224 n.64 (1992). 
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“Scripture Wedding”94 or grand banquet thrown for the entire community.95  
These couples considered themselves married before the eyes of God, the 
community, and in some cases, their owners.  But, of course, they were not 
married in the eyes of the law.96 
It was taken for granted by virtually all significant political actors, and 
surely by enslaved people themselves, that emancipation would entail the 
power to marry.97  And indeed it did.  Shortly after the end of the war, 
Southern states acted quickly to amend their constitutions or enact statutes 
validating the marriages of formerly enslaved people.  Laws that simply 
legitimized these marriages, as long as the couple was cohabiting as husband 
and wife when the law went into effect, were quite common.  Mississippi’s 
1865 civil rights law was typical:  “[A]ll freedmen, free Negroes and 
mulattoes, who do now and have heretofore lived and cohabited together as 
husband and wife shall be taken and held in law as legally married.”98 
Some states took a different approach to the marriage of formerly 
enslaved people, giving “all colored inhabitants of this State claiming to be 
living together in the relation of husband and wife . . . and who shall mutually 
desire to continue in that relation” nine months to formally remarry one 
another before a minister or civil authority.99  These laws further required 
newly married couples to file a marriage license with the county circuit court, a 
bureaucratic detail that carried a prohibitively high price for many 
 
94. Malone, supra note 93, at 224. 
95. See id. at 225 (“When weddings were allowed, they became community observations 
and social occasions rivaled only by Christmas and end-of-harvest celebrations.”). 
96. See Gutman, supra note 93, at 275–77; Litwack, supra note 93, at 240; Malone, supra 
note 93, at 224 n.64. 
97. See Davis, supra note 92, at 108–17; Eric Foner, Reconstruction:  America’s Unfinished 
Revolution 82–84 (1988); Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:  Law and the Family in 
Nineteenth-Century America 133 (1985); Gutman, supra note 93, at 204–07; Malone, supra note 
93, at 166; Noralee Frankel, Workers, Wives, and Mothers:  Black Women in Mississippi, 1860–
1870, at 146–47 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
98. Civil Rights Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 82. Georgia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia passed similar laws during this period.  See, e.g., Act of 
Mar. 9, 1866, tit. 31, § 5, 1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240 (prescribing and regulating the relation of 
husband and wife between persons of color); Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §§ 1–5, 1866 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 99, 99–101 (concerning negroes and persons of color or of mixed blood); Act of 
1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating domestic relations of persons of color, 
and amending the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy); Act of Feb. 27, 1865, ch. 18, § 2, 
1865 Va. Acts ch. 85 (legalizing marriages of colored persons now cohabitating as husband and 
wife), reprinted in June Purcell Guild, Black Laws of Virginia:  A Summary of the Legislative 
Acts of Virginia Concerning Negroes from Earliest Times to the Present 33 (1996); see also Laws 
Relating to Freedmen, Compiled by Command of Major General O.O. Howard, Commissioner, 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, S. Exec. Doc. No. 39-6, at 179 (1866) 
(collecting Black Laws assembled by the head of the Freedman’s Bureau and submitted to 
Congress in 1866–1867). 
99. Act of Jan. 11, 1866, ch. 1469, § 1, 1865 Fla. Laws ch. 31. 
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freedpeople.100  In every state with such laws, failure to comply with these 
requirements while continuing to cohabit would render the offenders subject to 
criminal prosecution for adultery and fornication.101  North Carolina gave 
freedpeople just under six months to register their marriages with the county 
clerk.  Each month they failed to do so constituted a distinct and separately 
prosecutable criminal offense.102 
While many formerly enslaved people merely allowed the law to operate 
upon them, automatically legitimizing their marriages, others “swamped public 
officials with demands to validate old and new unions.”103  Thus, the power to 
marry for African Americans in the immediate postbellum period had both 
symbolic and practical significance—symbolic in the sense that enjoyment of 
the power signaled acceptance into the moral community of civil society, and 
practical to the extent that social and economic benefits flowed from being 
legally married. 
The sight of gay and lesbian couples overwhelming San Francisco’s City 
Hall this February104 echoes the sheer delight, exuberance, even ecstasy with 
which formerly enslaved people overwhelmed local courthouses in search of 
marriage licenses in the immediate postbellum period.  While these two 
political moments and these two constituencies are dissimilar in significant 
respects, there is something valuable for us to learn in the present moment by 
studying the experiences of African Americans when they too were first 
granted the power to become husbands and wives. 
First of all, formerly enslaved people had developed a range of kin 
formations in the antebellum period.  Some have traced the variety of forms of 
intimacy, family, and kinship to African roots, to dysfunctional adaptation to 
the cruelty of enslavement, or to something distinctly wonderful about black 
culture.105  The ability to marry rendered many of these forms of intimate, 
domestic, and sexual life nonnormative, and worse, illegal.  Some black 
women believed that they could have more than one husband, since the forced 
 
100. North Carolina entitled the county clerk to charge the newlyweds a fee of twenty-five 
cents for the task of filing a certificate of marriage.  See Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, § 5, 1866 
N.C. Sess. Laws at 101.  In 1866, twenty-five cents was an amount of money that put nuptial 
legitimacy well outside the reach of most African Americans. 
101. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 14, 1866, ch. 1552, § 1, 1866 Fla. Laws ch. 22. 
102. See Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, § 6, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws at 101. 
103. Grossberg, supra note 97, at 133–34 (“In 1866 over 9,000 couples registered their 
marriages in seventeen North Carolina counties.”); see also Litwack, supra note 93, at 240–41 
(“Whatever the most compelling reason, mass wedding ceremonies involving as many as seventy 
couples at a time became a common sight in the postwar South.”). 
104. Miguel Marquez, More than 1,600 Same-Sex Marriages Performed, Feb. 15, 2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/02/15/same.sex.marriageindex.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
105. For a discussion of the variety of kinship formations developed by enslaved people and 
the theories that sought to explain them, see Katherine M. Franke, Becoming A Citizen:  
Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 251, 
258–74 (1999). 
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separation of enslaved families had meant that many people undertook serial 
marriages as their spouses were sold away.  Black women had a hard time 
accepting that they couldn’t be married to all the fathers of their children—all 
the men they had loved and lost.106  So too, the substantive and procedural 
requirements of legal divorce were underappreciated by many people, who 
extra-legally broke off with a spouse when the marriage failed and began 
another relationship with someone else.  These practices rendered many former 
slaves vulnerable to prosecutions for adultery, bigamy, and fornication, crimes 
that were felonies in many jurisdictions.107  Many people quickly learned that 
legal subjectivity entailed not only power, but responsibility and attendant 
punitive sanctions for intentional or naive transgressions of the law.  In this 
period, as well as in the present moment, becoming legitimate can be “an 
ambivalent gift,” as Judith Butler has noted,108 to the extent that the process by 
which styles of life become legitimized can, and often must, entail the 
delegitimization of other ways of being. 
The African American postbellum experience also warns us that the price 
of delegitimization is not one levied only by the state.  While local police and 
district attorneys were criminally prosecuting black people who violated the 
rules of marriage and divorce, many black men and women set to work on the 
project of enforcing respectability norms in their own communities.  Laura 
Edwards notes: 
Many African-American leaders were quite aware that white 
northerners and southerners alike used marriage as a barometer of 
their people’s fitness for freedom, and they urged poor blacks to 
adopt the domestic patterns common among elite whites. This, they 
argued, would help convince the nation that ex-slaves deserved the 
rights and privileges of freedom.109 
In support of this effort, one African American leader argued, “[l]et us do 
nothing to re-kindle the slumbering fires of prejudice between the two races.  
Remember, we are on trial before the tribunal of the nation and of the world, 
that it may be known . . . whether we are worthy to be a free, self-governing 
people.”110 
 
106. Id. at 283 n.152. 
107. Id. at 285–88. 
108. Butler, supra note 77, at 232. 
109. Laura F. Edwards, Gendered Strife and Confusion:  The Political Culture of 
Reconstruction 56 (1997). 
110. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting James H. Harris).  Immediately after the war, Federal 
Freedmen’s Bureau officers also compiled lists of exemplary African American men who might 
be appointed to various political offices in the military governments set up by the Bureau after 
Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act.  See Richard Lowe, The Freedmen’s Bureau and 
Local Black Leadership, 80 J. Am. Hist. 989 (1993).  Lowe argues that the “black men who, in 
[the Bureau’s] opinion, had demonstrated some ability and capacity for leadership in the two 
years since the end of slavery,” were more than likely light-skinned.  Id. at 992.  Bureau agents 
explicitly disfavored “black men who had already established a reputation for alienating the 
native white community.”  Id. at 995.  Thus, Lowe concludes, the “black leaders” listed by 
Bureau officers were not, in many cases, the people whom the Black community would have 
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Thus, it was not uncommon for “respectable” members of the community 
to turn in their erring brothers and sisters to white legal authorities if they were 
known to be cohabitating without marrying, maintaining more than one 
spouse, or violating the obligations of marital monogamy.111  In addition, 
close examination of the papers supporting arrest warrants and the witnesses 
who testified to grand juries in connection with the prosecution of black men 
for bigamy or adultery reveals that these prosecutions were initiated by the 
wives of these men.  These newly emancipated women had been automatically 
married to their husbands through continuous cohabitation or in some cases 
had gone through the formalities of obtaining a marriage license.  Their 
husbands, however, had taken up with other women and the first wives had 
resorted to criminal legal authorities either to punish their men or to try to get 
them back.  The extant documents unfortunately do not reveal the women’s 
motivations for turning their husbands in to local law enforcement on bigamy 
or adultery charges.112 
While acknowledging the substantial distinctions between the 
circumstances of freedpeople in the immediate postbellum period and gays and 
lesbians today, I offer this parallel experience in order to illuminate some of 
the risks in pursuing a civil rights program that places too much emphasis on 
state-based recognition and legal legitimization.  At a time when formerly 
enslaved people sought to create distance between themselves and white 
authority (whether it be private or public authority), many of them assumed 
 
identified had they been asked.  Here, as elsewhere, the freedmen who won the praises of white 
military and civilian authorities served as examples against which “bad blacks” were unfavorably 
compared for refusing to play within the bounds of white supremacy and Victorian ideology. 
111. The Criminal Action Papers from Granville County, North Carolina for the years 
1869–1876 provide an example of this dynamic.  The number of prosecutions for fornication and 
adultery increased substantially in 1875, and many of these cases involved black people.  The 
papers show Willis and Chaney Chandler, a black couple, as complaining witnesses on the 
indictments of other members of the black community.  These documents leave the impression 
that the Chandlers were actively cooperating with the local police by ferreting out “marital 
outlaws.”  Ironically, Willis and Chaney Chandler appear on an indictment in July of 1875, not as 
witnesses but as defendants—it appears they too had not been formally married.  Indictment—
Fornication and Adultery, State of North Carolina, Granville County Superior Court, July 1875, 
Granville County Criminal Action Papers, 1873–1875, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, 
North Carolina (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
112. For example, Albert Watkins and Anna Williams were jointly prosecuted for bigamy 
by the Warren County District Attorney in Vicksburg, Mississippi in June of 1866.  Indeed, their 
case was the first bigamy prosecution brought in the Vicksburg criminal courts when the civilian 
courts reopened after the Civil War ended.  Albert had married Anna on June 8, 1866, and on that 
afternoon Albert’s first wife, Josephine, filed a criminal complaint with the local sheriff.  
Josephine maintained that she and Albert had been automatically married by operation of law on 
November 25, 1865, when the Mississippi law relating to freedmen’s marriages went into effect.  
See Civil Rights Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 3, 1865 Miss. Laws 82.  In the end, both Albert 
and Anna were found not guilty.  Affidavit of Josephine Watkins, col’d v. Albert Watkins, col’d, 
Bigamy, June 8, 1866, and Indictment State v. Albert Watkins, June 25, 1866; Indictment State v. 
Anna Williams F.W.C., June 25, 1866, Warren County Criminal Action Papers, Old Court 
House, Vicksburg, Mississippi (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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that the “freedom to marry” meant that they would be able to set the terms and 
conditions of marriage independent of state oversight.  What they didn’t realize 
was that the “freedom” they gained in the power to marry had the effect of 
bringing them into a closer relationship with the state—a relationship that 
empowered the state to govern the intimate and kin relations that freedpeople 
were making outside the bounds of enslavement.  Thus, they too exchanged 
one extremely harsh form of legal regulation—enslavement—for another in the 
form of marriage, and shortly thereafter, contract labor.  In many important 
respects, freedom for the newly emancipated people of the South meant being 
embedded in a web of legal rights and powers—the power to marry, the right 
to alienate their labor according to the contract labor system, and the right to 
acquire debt, for example.  Freed men and women quickly discovered that, in 
many respects, the liberty rights they were enjoying for the first time ended up 
forming the basis of a new kind of governance—governance by the state, 
governance by private employers, governance by “respectable” members of the 
community, all designed to incentivize self-governance.  So too, the project of 
“civilizing” freed men and women through law entailed the cultivation of a 
range of desires—desires for rights, desires for a bourgeois form of marriage 
grounded in monogamy and domesticity, desires for legal subjectivity even 
when that status was delivered explicitly as an alternative to the allocation of 
material resources to freed men and women. 
This account also illustrates the capillary nature of state regulation and 
power during Reconstruction.  Freedpeople interiorized an individualized sense 
of self-regulation characterized by punctuality, order, ambition, hard work, 
cleanliness, and domesticity.  These technologies of the self became the 
credentials that Northern officials looked for when considering whether and, if 
so, when freedmen had proven themselves eligible for citizenship.  “Being a 
free citizen, he must act as one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them, 
as well as enjoying the privileges of his new condition,”113 cautioned the chief 
judge of the Georgia Supreme Court in 1881. 
CONCLUSION 
Then as now, rights deliver their own peculiar form of practical freedom.  
Something more is required of the political subjects and communities that are 
making demands for rights.  Then as now, we risk being recognized as rights 
holders only to the extent that we perform what David Scott calls 
“responsibilized” freedom, grounded in rationalized self-discipline.114  It is 
unquestionably true that many of the freedmen who rushed to be married in 
1865 and 1866, as well as the gay and lesbian couples that stood in the rain 
outside San Francisco’s City Hall waiting for marriage licenses last February, 
experienced a real sense of rapture at the moment they were declared husband 
 
113. Williams v. Georgia, 67 Ga. 260, 263 (1881). 
114. David Scott, Refashioning Futures:  Criticism After Postcoloniality 84, 87 (1999). 
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and wife, husband and husband, or wife and wife.  My objective here is not to 
doubt the ecstasy these couples experience at these moments of state-
recognition, but rather to urge us to adopt a critical stance with respect to that 
ecstasy.  We cannot not want it, but what is its price?  What other forms of 
rapture, of belonging, of the self, are rendered less legible, less viable, and 
more marginal when the state credits some human affiliations as sacred?  By 
demanding of public officials—”Are you for or against gay marriage?”—we 
have set up a binary with dangerous implications.  Other forms of affiliation 
besides marriage, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships to name the 
most conventional alternatives, become positioned as the harbor of cowards 
and those who favor the cause too little.  We have thereby foreclosed the 
exploration of family, intimate, sexual, and kin formations other than marriage.  
Securing social recognition for these other affiliations is regarded as either a 
compromise or a loss, notwithstanding the fact that these other forms of life 
provide viable sites in which to elaborate a self.  
A politics that is limited to the acquisition of rights is not up to the ethical 
task of at once acknowledging the “unfreedom” that lies in denying same-sex 
couples the power to wed, while also recognizing the limits and costs of 
privatized liberty.  While we celebrate the result in Lawrence, we should 
remain wary of the impulses and desires that are, in part, motivated by Justice 
Kennedy’s reasoning. 
I am inclined to end with a prediction:  Within a relatively short period, 
opposition to gay marriage will dissipate, but not because those who now 
disfavor it will come around to the righteousness of the cause.  Rather, it will 
subside because the decriminalization of sodomy and of gay and lesbian sexual 
relationships will have created a social terrain in which a vast number of sexual 
relationships will appear to stand outside the legal order altogether.115  This, I 
believe, will prove to be an unbearable state of affairs for those who have 
always favored the governance, surveillance, and supervision of sexuality.  
Bringing same-sex couples within the regulatory reach of marriage will in the 
not too distant future emerge as a better choice than leaving these sexual 
subjects in the underregulated space that lies between criminalization and 
legitimization through marriage.116 
 
115. Of course, many gay men and lesbians have and will continue to regard their formally 
unregulated relationships as being governed ethically and practically by the shadow of marriage.  
At the same time, many of those who oppose gay marriage fail to see marriage as an institution 
that casts a shadow of any kind—either you are part of the institution and live by its rules or you 
wander in the wasteland of iniquity. 
116.   This concern could be addressed in another way, I suppose. In 2000, the American 
Law Institute adopted new principles relating to the formation and dissolution of domestic 
partnerships, whether between same or different sex individuals. ALI, Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, ch. 6, at 907 (2000) (“Domestic 
Partnerships”).  The ALI Principles recommend that courts adopt a default rule recognizing a 
domestic partnership if, among other things, two persons have maintained a joint household for a 
cohabitation period of possibly two or three years.  Id. § 6.03(2)–(5), § 6.03 cmt. d, at 916–17, 
921.  To escape the presumption in favor of a domestic partnership, the couple would have to 
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Who knows if I am right?  But the fact that this prediction is entirely 
plausible should give the gay community pause in its rush to law, to 
recognition, and to state sanction.  This regulatory middle ground and 
transitional space is precisely where Lawrence lands us.  It is an uncharted 
territory that is worth exploring, and possibly expanding, rather than 
discrediting by virtue of its dissimilarity to domestinormative marriage. 
 
have made an enforceable contract to the contrary, id. § 6.03 cmt. b, at 919, but they need not 
have reached a mutual explicit agreement between themselves that their relationship acquire this 
particular legal status.  Id.  Form, not intent, is fundamental here.  If a relationship is found to be a 
domestic partnership, a wide range of rules will be applied to the parties relating to the 
distribution of property upon the termination of the relationship.  See id. § 6.04–.05, at 937–41.  
So, it is possible that the ALI's principles will do the trick of filling in much of the underregulated 
space that unmarried gay couples inhabit, and this will make many people, both gay and straight, 
quite happy. 
        Yet African Americans’ experiences with automatic marriage illustrate the danger and 
discipline of these regulatory default rules. As gay men and lesbians creep ever closer to 
traditional marriage, and marriage rules migrate ever farther from the formal institution of 
marriage, smaller and smaller social space is left for those people who want to resist the default 
rules and norms of marriage. Unfortunately, Lawrence's domestinormativity will likely make this 
problem even worse by supporting the expansion of the shadow of marriage. 
 
